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Abstract—JavaScript functions have been remarkably 
enhanced thanks to the emergence of the next generation web 
standard HTML5 presented by W3C. HTML5 provides 
powerful functions that could replace non-standard technologies 
such as Active X by providing functions such as media play, 3-D 
graphic processing and Web socket communications using 
JavaScript only without the installation of separate plugins. 
Along with these trends in the ICT environment, many studies 
have been done related to threats exploiting JavaScript, which 
comprises a core of HTML5 functions.  There are, however, 
many limitations in detecting obfuscated malicious scripts since 
most detection techniques use signature-based pattern 
matching. This paper will propose a method capable of detecting 
obfuscated malicious scripts at the host level and preventing the 
scripts’ execution. 
 
Index Terms—Script-based CyberAttack; Web Security; 
Obfuscated Malicious Script. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The type of services provided through the web has been 
gradually diversified due to the development of web 
applications. Provision of such services in the past had 
required use of non-standard plugins such as Active X, 
entailing a security threat. As such issues have emerged, the 
HTML 5 standard that can replace Active X by using a 
JavaScript only has been presented in the recent W3C. 
HTML5 has powerful measures that can substitute for Active 
X’s functions such as media play, graphic processing and web 
socket communications utilizing the new JavaScript API 
using a new tag and JavaScript while maintaining 
compatibility with the existing HTML. The role of JavaScript 
has grown, so the security threat has also [1]. Moreover, the 
concept of obfuscation has emerged to protect the developers’ 
ideas or algorithms since JavaScript is typically used as a 
client-side language [2]. Apart from its primary purpose, this 
is often used to bypass security products by hiding malicious 
codes by hackers. 
Most of the ways for web attack by hackers causes a 
malicious behavior by making a user install and execute a 
malicious code in the form of drive by download by 
exploiting the vulnerabilities of web applications. However, 
the attacks incurring a malicious behavior only by accessing 
the web site using a JavaScript have recently been found. It is 
difficult to detect and respond against to the attacks using a 
JavaScript because the attacks are executed and terminated 
through a web browser without a separate execution file, and 
such attacks do not leave any traceable footprints after the 
browser is closed. Also, most of the JavaScripts are 
obfuscated for the performance and security, it is possible to 
bypass detection techniques using signature-based static 
pattern matching. Therefore, in this paper we describe the 
danger of the obfuscated JavaScript attacks and the 
countermeasure for detecting such attacks and responding 
against to those. 
In Section 2, we explain the method for obfuscating 
JavaScripts. Section 3 describes the technology for 
responding to obfuscated malicious scripts. In section 4, we 
explain the conclusions and further works. 
 
II. RELEVANT RESEARCH 
 
A. JavaScript Obfuscation Technique 
Recent web attacks have made signature-based detection 
difficult through obfuscation. Two most simple ways of the 
web attacks are: a string split technique which splits a 
malicious script code into a number of script codes and then, 
recombines and outputs; and a string replacement technique 
which replaces a set of strings into an ASCII type string using 
an encoding function such as escape and unescape. In 
addition to the two techniques, there are a variety of attacks 
such as a technique using a known obfuscation technique as 
shown in Figure 1, a bypass technique using Base64 
encoding, a technique using XOR encoding, etc. which 
simply bypass a signature-based IDS/IPS complexly using 
various obfuscation methods [3]. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: An example of JavaScript obfuscation 
 
B. Malicious Web Attack Detection Technique 
Methods for detecting web attacks can be roughly 
classified into a method which detects attacks at network 
level and a method which detects attacks at the host level. In 
this paper, countermeasures at network level are not 
considered. 
Many studies for detecting malicious web attacks at the 
host level have been performed. One simple, immediate 
method to address attacks is to examine an accessed URL 
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address. One representative technology is McAfee’s 
SiteAdvisor [4]. This is a method for detecting malicious 
attacks by checking whether the URL address, which a web 
browser is accessing, has a history of malicious attacks. This 
technology is capable of immediate response since it only 
checks the ULR being accessed however, it is difficult to 
address when the attacker attempts attacks by frequently 
changing URLs. In order to address the problem, methods for 
analyzing downloaded web contents and responding against 
the attacks has been devised. Long Lu has proposed one 
solution, called BLADE [5], which is a web browser-based 
incident detection system. BLADE is a detection system 
which detects an execution file being downloaded through 
web browser by isolating the execution file into a safe area, 
executing the file and detects malicious attacks based on 
behaviors incurred due to the execution. However, it has 
many difficulties in detecting the incurred malicious 
behaviors using a script without execution file. 
To solve such limitation, a WMDS technique has been 
prepared [6]. WMDS proposes a malicious behavior 
detection module, called Observer, to monitor the web 
browser which is a base for web attack. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Configuration of Observer 
 
The configuration of Observer consists of File Monitor, 
Registry Monitor, Service Monitor, Network Monitor and 
Process & Thread Monitor as shown in Figure 2. It detects 
malicious behaviours by detecting events occurring at each 
process through API hooking by attaching Observer to the 
each of the corresponding processes such as File, Registry, 
Service, etc. and by analysing the events detected by 
Observers. This technique is capable of detecting malicious 
behaviours regardless of the existence of execution file since 
it monitors a browser which is a base for web attack, however, 
it results in a high load on the system as Observers are used 
for the all the processes. 
Therefore, we present a technique which can detect 
malicious behaviours resulting solely from a obfuscated 
script at the host level through the web with a relatively lower 
load, compared to the existing ones. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Observers attached to the each of the processes 
 
III. OBFUSCATED MALICIOUS SCRIPT RESPONSE 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
A basic configuration of the technology is shown in Figure 
4. It collects target analysis contents from a web browser 
through Browser Helper Object (BHO) and extension-type 
script security program for Internet Explorer and Chrome, 
respectively, and transmits the collected contents to an agent 
which is in charge of analysis. The analysis agent determines 
whether the contents is malicious or not by analyzing the 
corresponding contents and transmit the result to the script 
security program. The script security program that receives 
the result redirects to a safe page or stops the JavaScript on 
the corresponding page if a malicious behavior is detected 
and terminates the analysis of the corresponding web page if 
the result is found normal without further processing. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Software configuration for malicious script detection 
 
A. Script Security Program 
A script security program has been realized in the form of 
browser plugin (BHO) in order to detect a specific event of 
the web browser, and the method detects, collects and 
transmits the specific event of the web browser through the 
script security program to the analysis agent. 
This technology uses a predetermined interface, called 
IObjectWithSite provided by IE-BHO to detect events 
occurring on a web browser. It detects an event [7] which 
occurs at the time of Object Download shown in Figure 5 
using the interface and extracts the downloaded object by 
stopping rendering. The script information among the 
information of the object is transmitted to the analysis agent. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The time of web browser event occurrence 
 
Furthermore, it receives the analysis result from the 
analysis agent and performs post-process according to the 
result. If the analyzed result is normal, the rendering of the 
web browser is resumed. But, if a malicious code is found, 
two different post-processes will be performed. 
The first one is to protect a user from the malicious script 
by redirecting the user to a safe page and the second one is to 
prevent execution of the malicious script by stopping the 
JavaScript on the corresponding web page. 
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B. Analysis Agent Program 
In the analysis agent, the received script information is 
analyzed and whether the information has a malicious code is 
determined. First, the analysis agent determines which target 
analysis scripts are obfuscated. Functions frequently used for 
obfuscation are the criteria for the determination. Functions, 
such as Eval(), Document.write(), etc. capable of execution 
JavaScript, are often used for obfuscation [3] and the analysis 
agent consider there is obfuscation when those functions are 
found. The corresponding script performs a routine for 
deobfuscation. To deobfuscate the script, the agent extracts 
the original script by inputting the corresponding script into 
the customized JavaScript engine called V8 which is being 
used on a Chrome browser and by executing the script. As 
shown in Figure 6, the extracted original script is determined 
whether it has a malicious code through pattern matching 
with a YARA RULE-type signature [8] recording pattern 
information of malicious scripts. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: YARA RULE signature of malicious script 
 
If the extracted original script is determined to be 
malicious, detection information such as detection time and 
type of malicious script as shown in Figure 7 is provided to 
the user in real time using a pop-up notification. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Real time detection notification 
 
Also, the user’s terminal can be protected by transmitting 
the analyzed result to the script security program and making 
the script security program perform post-process. Finally, the 
corresponding module periodically or upon request updates 
the signature and stores a detection log which includes 
information such as the detection time, type of malicious 
script, etc. Figure 8 shows the entire flow of malicious script 
detection described above. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
 
Compared to functions using the existing HTML, 
JavaScript functions have been remarkably enhanced due to 
the emergence of HTML5 as presented by W3C. As a result, 
the functions that can replace non-standard technologies such 
as Active X have drawn closer to daily life, but the threats 
that can result in damage have, too. 
This paper proposed a technique for responding to 
malicious attack threats occurring by using JavaScript at the 
host level. Since JavaScript operates on a browser, the 
analysis targets were collected by stopping the loading of the 
browser before the corresponding script was executed 
through browser extension. We determined whether the 
analysis targets were obfuscated by checking the functions 
often used for obfuscation among the collected analysis 
targets, and proposed a measure for detecting and blocking 
malicious scripts based on signature. This technique has 
several limitations, however, since it responds to such attacks 
at the host level using browser extensions. Another problem 
is dependence on a web browser on the type and version due 
to the features of a browser plugin known as a development 
type of script security program. Furthermore, the technique 
could detect known obfuscation methods such as base62 and 
base64, but had difficulty detecting new obfuscation 
methods. So, we can improve performance by minimizing 
dependence on an operating system and browser on the type 
and version, and research an algorithm for detecting 
obfuscation. 
 
 
Figure 8: Malicious script detection flow 
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